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KEKUKUHAN PENGURUSAN DAN DASAR PEMBAYARAN DIVIDEN 
SYARIKAT AWAM TERSENARAI MALAYSIA 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Tesis ini meneliti pengaruh kekukuhan pengurusan terhadap pengagihan 
dividen syarikat. Ini termasuk kesan pengurusan berkekukuhan tinggi ke atas peluang 
pelaburan, tadbir urus dalaman (saiz lembaga pengarah, ahli lembaga asing, dan undi 
pemilik terbesar), pemantauan oleh tadbir urus luaran (kebebasan lembaga 
pengarah), insentif Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif (ganjaran dan opsyen saham) dan jenis 
pemilikan yang berlainan (pemilikan tertumpu, pemilikan kerajaan, pemilikan asing, 
dan pemilikan pengurusan). Tesis ini menganalisa 327 syarikat yang tersenarai di 
Bursa Malaysia dari tahun 2005 hingga 2010. Analisis regresi data panel telah 
digunakan untuk menganalisis data. Indek kekukuhan pengurusan dibentuk 
menggunakan kaedah analisis prinsip komponen. Dua indeks kekukuhan pengurusan, 
iaitu ENT1 dan ENT2, disediakan.  
Keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa tahap kekukuhan pengurusan 
mempengaruhi keputusan dividen. Pengurusan berkekukuhan tinggi membayar 
dividen yang lebih lumayan. Pengaruh mereka kuat dalam sektor keluaran 
perindustrian dan sektor perdagangan dan perkhidmatan. Bagaimanapun, pengaruh 
mereka sederhana dalam sektor keluaran pengguna dan lemah dalam sektor hartanah. 
Pembayaran keseluruhan syarikat (dividen tambah pembelian balik saham) 
berkurangan atau bertambah mengikut tahap kekukuhan pengurusan.  
xvii 
 
Di bawah tadbir urus dalaman, saiz lembaga pengarah mempengaruhi 
pembayaran dividen secara positif di bawah pengurusan yang berkukuh tinggi. Ahli 
lembaga asing boleh mempengaruhi pengurusan yang kukuh, tetapi hanya dalam kes 
ENT2 tinggi. Kuasa mengundi pemegang saham terbanyak dan kebebasan lembaga 
pengarah tidak mempunyai pengaruh yang signifikan ke atas keputusan dividen, di 
bawah pengurusan ENT2 tinggi. Pengurus berkekukuhan tinggi, ENT1, boleh 
menentukan ganjaran mereka tidak berkait dengan hasil dividen. Opsyen saham tidak 
memberi sebarang impak terhadap pembayaran dividen di bawah pengurus yang 
mempunyai kekukuhan tinggi.  
Pemilikan tertumpu dan pemilikan kerajaan kuat mempengarui keputusan 
dividen apabila syarikat dikawal oleh pengurus berkekukuhan tinggi. Pemilikan 
asing dalam syarikat mempunyai pengaruh yang kuat ke atas keputusan dividen, jika 
pengurus berkekukuhan tinggi menguasai syarikat. Pemilikan asing mempunyai 
hubungan yang negatif dengan pembayaran dividen di bawah pengurus 
berkekukuhan tinggi, ENT1. Demikian juga, pemilikan pengurusan tidak mempunyai 
pengaruh yang kuat di bawah pengurus berkekukuhan tinggi. 
Sebagai kesimpulan, mekanisme urus tadbir korporat mungkin tidak 
berfungsi dengan secekapnya dalam syarikat di mana pemilikannya di bawah 
pengurusan berkukuhan tinggi. Oleh yang demikian, agensi-agensi kawalan harus   
memperbaiki lagi mekanisme urus tadbir korporat di Malaysia ke arah 
penguatkuasaan perlindungan lebih baik untuk pemilik saham. 
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MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT AND DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICY OF 
MALAYSIAN PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the influence of managerial entrenchment towards 
companies’ dividend distribution. This includes the effects of high managerial 
entrenchment on investment opportunities, internal governance, monitoring by 
external governance, CEO incentives, and different types of ownership. The thesis 
analyzed 327 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2005 to 2010. Panel data 
regression was used to analyse the data. The managerial entrenchment Index was 
developed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). There are two indexes 
developed in this thesis, namely ENT1 and ENT2. 
The results showed that the level of managerial entrenchment strongly 
influenced dividend decisions. Highly entrenched managers pay better dividends. 
Their influence was noted to be particularly strong in the industrial products and 
trading and services sectors. However, their influence was moderate in the consumer 
products sector and weak in the property sector. Entrenched managers preferred 
dividend payout instead of share repurchase. It is evident that company’s total payout 
(dividend plus share repurchase) decreases or increases with the level of managerial 
entrenchment. 
Under internal governance, board size positively influenced dividend payout 
when there is a highly entrenched manager. Foreign board members could influence 
dividend payout if high ENT2 exists. When a company is managed by a highly 
entrenched manager, ENT2, voting power of the largest shareholders as well as 
xix 
 
board independence has no significant influence on dividend decisions. Highly 
entrenched managers, ENT1, could ensure that their remuneration is unrelated to 
dividend yield. Granting stock options has no impact on dividend payout if company 
is controlled by highly entrenched managers. Concentrated and government 
ownership companies strongly affect dividend decisions, if highly entrenched 
managers control the company. Foreign ownership had a negative relationship with 
dividend payout under highly entrenched managers, ENT1. Similarly, managerial 
ownership had no influence on dividend payout in the presence of highly entrenched 
managers.  
In conclusion, corporate governance mechanisms might not function 
efficiently in concentrated ownership companies under entrenched managers. 
Therefore, regulatory agencies should improve the mechanisms of corporate 
governance in Malaysia to enforce better protection for shareholders. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
In present times, given the separation of ownership and management in 
companies, the owners do not normally manage the companies themselves. They 
appoint professional managers or CEOs to run the companies on their behalf. 
Managers are among the critical people responsible for the success of companies. 
They implement the strategies laid out by the board of directors. To some extent, the 
manager entrenches his or her position. At this stage, some managers misuse their 
power for their own benefits, creating what is commonly termed as agency problems. 
The manager might make decisions that are not in the interest of the shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The shareholders are more concerned about their wealth, 
be it in the form of dividends, share repurchase, or total payout. 
1.1  Background of Study 
Managerial entrenchment is closely related to the action and power of 
managers of companies. According to Weisbach (1988), managerial entrenchment 
occurs when managers gain so much power that, they are able to use the company to 
pursue their own interest rather than that of the shareholders. Berger, Ofek, & 
Yermack (1997) defined entrenchment as the extent to which managers fail to be 
disciplined, even with the full range of corporate governance and control 
mechanisms in place, including monitoring by the board, the threat of dismissal or 
takeover, and stock- or compensation-based performance incentives. In a company 
with weak board of directors, and strong antitakeover provisions, managerial 
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entrenchment is most likely to take place. With a low probability of being fired for 
poor performance, the manager could generally influence the company to guarantee 
his/her employment with an attractive salary (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny,1988), 
enjoy perquisites at the expense of shareholders (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003), 
and even stop payment of dividends without triggering shareholders’ response 
(Wang, 2011).  
Generally, there are two decisions of a manager that have significant impact 
on stock price, as suggested by Healy and Palepu (1990). First, the manager decides 
on the amount of debt in the company’s capital structure. Second, he or she decides 
on how much earnings to be paid out as dividends, if any. Whenever changes in the 
company’s business get risky or earnings are foreseen, the manager devises new 
corporate policy. Moreover, the manager evaluates the company’s investment 
projects based not only on the goal of maximising shareholder wealth, but also on the 
personal benefits to be gained from it (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).  
The owners and shareholders consider it costly to fire the managers even if 
they do not agree with what he or she is doing. Depending on the situation, the 
shareholders simply sell out their interest. If the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, it would be even more difficult for the majority shareholders or institutional 
owners, to fire him or her. 
The probability of selecting an external CEO arises with the level of stock 
ownership of large shareholders and the fraction of the board seats being held by 
outsiders (Park & Rozeff, 1986). Managerial entrenchment increases as the company 
size increases, and its performance improves. Shareholder value gets higher when an 
external CEO is hired, in lieu of appointing one through internal promotion. 
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Additionally, shareholder value reduces if the new CEO has a higher level of 
ownership relative to the level of ownership of the outgoing CEO, unless the 
company has large external shareholders. 
According to Rath (2007), there are three implications when a CEO has 
greater influence on the corporate infrastructure. First, the information asymmetries 
provide CEOs greater discretion in decision making in all corporate policies. Thus, it 
creates difficulties for companies to continuously monitor their CEOs. Second, 
companies face difficulties in finding the right new CEOs. As such, with fewer 
suitable candidates in the managerial labour market to replace the existing CEOs, 
there would be a disequilibrium between pay and performance. Third, a CEO who 
exhibits greater risk-aversion in his or her decision making further entrenches 
himself or herself in the company. This happens since high investment in company-
specific human capital leads to problem of adverse selection in corporate decision 
making. When companies have high level of managerial entrenchment and low 
leverage, it helps to improve board control (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990), while 
monitoring by shareholders could lead to an increase in the value of companies 
(Gillan & Starks, 2000).  
1.2  Corporate Governance in Malaysia  
In Malaysia, since 2001 (revised 2007), the Code of Corporate Governance 
was gradually enforced on companies listed on Bursa Malaysia to improve the 
monitoring mechanism. The MCCG outlined certain conditions on the structures and 
functions of board of directors, audit committees, and external auditors to safeguard 
shareholders’ interest. The MCCG 2012 focuses on strengthening the board structure 
and composition, including recognizing the role of directors as active and responsible 
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fiduciaries. The Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group was established in 2001 to 
protect minority shareholders’ interest and promote shareholder activism. Though 
this shows that Malaysia has strong legal protections, the MCCG appears to be 
effective only outwardly. In fact, enforcement remains weak. Managerial 
entrenchment still exists and expropriation of minority interest continuously takes 
place in Malaysia (Mohamed Yunos, Smith, Ismail, & Ahmad, 2011). To avoid this 
conflict, dividend payments could be used as one of the company’s monitoring 
devices (Rozeff, 1982). Companies could limit the cash available for managers if 
high dividend payments are paid to shareholders based on the free cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). 
The ineffectiveness of corporate governance continues to surface around the 
world with scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and some other companies in 
the US; and Transmile Bhd., Megan Media Holding Bhd. and recently Sime Darby in 
Malaysia. As a result, many believe that existing corporate governance devices are 
unable to fully control the behaviour of managers. As suggested by numerous 
authors, dividend is a good mechanism to control the behaviour of the manager, 
therefore, it is important to address this issue in the Malaysian market. 
As stated under MCCG (revised 2007), companies should examine the size of 
the board to ensure the effectiveness. Board of directors is the internal governance 
mechanism that the company could use to monitor and control the agency problem. 
However, in Malaysia, companies with large shareholders (through voting rights) 
have significant power to influence the appointment of board members. Moreover, 
the appointed members tend to serve the interests of major shareholders 
(Satkunasingam and Shanmugam, 2006). Malaysian family owned companies prefer 
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to elect family members or their close friends to sit on the board. They are reluctant 
to appoint independent directors as they could lose control of company decisions 
(Meng, 2009). It is not the role of audit committees to control the agency problem 
faced by Malaysian companies. Most of the time they act as a ‘rubber stamp’ and 
committees are formed to comply with the requirements (Zulkarnain & Shamsher, 
2007). Hence, board of directors, independent directors or audit committees are 
ineffective as monitoring devices to control managers who have entrenched 
themselves. As the abovementioned mechanism fails to reduce agency conflict in 
Malaysian companies, this thesis intends to evaluate the effectiveness of dividend 
payout policy as a control mechanism. 
Dividends play an important role in achieving business objectives. Fowdar, 
Subadar, Lamport, and Sannassee (2007) indicate that no single economic rationale 
could possibly explain the dividend phenomenon, or capture the puzzle about the 
reality of corporate dividend behaviour. Based on section 365 of the Companies Act 
1965 “no dividend shall be payable to the shareholders of any company except out of 
profit or pursuant to section 60.” Under section 60, “the share premium account may 
be applied in the payment of dividends if such dividends are satisfied by the issue of 
shares to members of the company.” As shown in Figure 1.1, earnings per share 
(EPS) for the plantation and trading/services sectors appear to be higher than the 
finance sector. However, between them, the finance sector pays higher dividend per 
share. Hence, in Malaysia, different sectors have different dividend per share ratios, 
regardless of their earnings. 
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During the period 1994-1996, among the five Asian countries, Malaysia 
recorded the highest rating for corporate governance at 3.85 and Thailand, the lowest 
at 2.12. Unfortunately, despite the high rating, Malaysia had the lowest dividend 
payout of 23.3% compared with other Asian countries. Mismanagement by 
managers, fraud and poor governance led to losses or bankruptcy during the Asian 
financial crisis (Noordin, 1999). During the crisis, Malaysian companies were among 
the top three dividend payers, after Hong Kong and Singapore. They distributed 
dividends to retain shareholder confidence towards company’s performance. The 
lack of effectiveness of the governance mechanism and frauds by managers still 
continue to be reported. Since the period of study used in this thesis falls within the 
financial crisis years 2007-2008, it is considered essential that this thesis address the 
managerial involvement in setting dividend payout under different economic periods.  
 Figure 1.1:  Ranking of industry sector by average DPS and EPS:  
2004-2008.  Adapted from Dividend Survey Report 2009; MSWG 
2009. 
Ranking of Industry Sector by Average DPS and EPS, 
2004 - 2008
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
INF
RA
ST
RU
CT
UR
E 
FIN
AN
CE
PL
AN
TA
TIO
N
CO
NS
UM
ER
RE
ITs
TR
AD
ING
/SE
RV
ICE
S
IND
US
TR
IAL
CO
NT
RU
CT
ION
PR
OP
ER
TIE
S
HO
TE
L
TE
CH
NO
LO
GY
Industry 
Sectors
(R
M
)
 5- Year Average DPS (RM) 5-Year Average EPS (RM)
7 
 
Therefore, this thesis investigates the effects of managerial entrenchment during 
three stages, namely pre, during and post financial crisis.  
1.3 Ownership structure in Malaysia 
Asia is characterized by a concentrated shareholding system. It has non-
competitive product markets, weak legal protection, governance by large 
shareholders rather than by managers, low opportunities for management to 
specialize, poor diversification in investments, and increased risks of expropriation 
of external shareholders by insiders. The concentrated shareholding system results in 
the equity market becoming less-developed, though in Malaysia, the equity market is 
very sizeable (Colin & Fancis, 2003). 
In the Malaysian context, the traditional agency conflict between manager 
and shareholders is not relevant as the companies are highly controlled by larger 
shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Tam & Tan, 2007). Dividend 
payment, as cash distribution, might be useful to reduce agency problem between the 
majority and minority shareholders. Malaysia is typically characterized as 
concentrated shareholdings in the hands of individual investors and large block 
shareholders. They hold at least 5% of equity ownership (Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 
2006). Large block shareholders are normally families or financial institutions. The 
agency costs in family companies are more complex due to managerial entrenchment 
and information altruism (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). Hence, 
this thesis focuses on the dividend payout policy, because empirical studies show that 
it has a significant role in reducing agency conflict under weak governance 
mechanism and entrenched manager control of management.  
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As Table 1.1 shows, in Malaysian companies, families hold around 44.7% of 
their shares. Examples of Malaysian companies with family ownership are Tan 
Chong Motor Holdings Bhd., YTL Group, and the IOI Group. With such a high level 
of concentration, there would be a strong monitoring power over company 
managerial decisions. In Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and 
Taiwan, 15% to 80% of companies have managers who are family members, as the 
controlling owners (Claessens et al., 2000). Family CEOs easily get entrenched since 
family status conveys additional power. They are less likely to be removed from the 
position, even though they perform poorly compared to non-family CEOs (Dahya, 
Lonie, & Power, 1998). In Malaysia, family CEOs with ownership control of above 
30% show greater entrenchment. They tend to set low dividend payout and have a 
high tendency to expropriate minority shareholders (Huei, Ken, Kwong & Philip, 
2012).  
Table 1.1 
The Control of  Publicly Traded Companies in East Asia, 2008 (20% Cut off) 
  
Widely held  
(%) 
Family 
(%) 
State 
(%) 
Widely held 
Financial  
(%) 
Widely held 
Corporation 
 (%) 
Malaysia 13.2 44.7 33.5 0.6 4.3 
Indonesia 13.1 50 13.5 2.2 13.3 
Thailand  38.6 33.3 12.1 2.3 7.8 
Philippines 7.6 76.5 3.4 1.9 5.9 
Singapore 18.5 51.9 19.6 1.7 3.9 
Note. Adapted from "Changes to the Ownership and Control of East Asian 
Corporations between 1996 and 2008: The primacy of Politics," by R. W. 
Carney & T. B. Child, 2013, Journal of Financial Economics, 107, pp. 494–
513. 
 
Government-controlled institutions also hold significant shares in the 
Malaysian listed companies. Government ownership is established when company 
shares are held by federal/state institutions, agencies, and government-linked 
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companies (GLCs). However, instead of placing more emphasis on their social 
objective, government-controlled companies in Malaysia appear to be more closely 
politically connected (Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). Nevertheless, agency costs 
still arise in government-controlled companies (Eng & Mark, 2003). They face 
conflicting objectives, between pure profit goals as commercial businesses and goals 
related to the interest of the nation. Thus, maximization of shareholder wealth might 
not be the priority for GLCs. Managers of these types of companies are less likely to 
face disciplinary action from the market for corporate control. This is because the 
government, a long-term investor of the GLCs is unlikely to support unsolicited 
takeover offers. Hence, with less governance, there is a greater potential for misuse 
of company funds by managers.  
Foreign ownership equity is a significant component of Malaysian total 
corporate holdings. In Malaysia, foreign-controlled companies use a significant 
portion of their earnings to pay dividends (ROSC, 2005). In terms of dividend 
payment, foreign companies recorded the highest payouts in Malaysia. British 
American Tobacco (Malaysia) Berhad was the highest dividend payer for the year 
2008, at RM2.63 per share, followed by DiGi.Com Berhad, and Nestle (Malaysia) 
Berhad (MSWG, 2009). Among these top three dividend payers, two are producers 
of consumer products. Foreign ownership companies monitor more closely the 
management and put pressure for profits on self-interest managers. There is lesser 
tendency for the entrenched manager to choose projects with negative NPV 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001).  
 
 
10 
 
1.4  Development of Share Repurchase in Malaysia  
Share repurchase was initiated around 14 years ago after the Malaysian stock 
market was seriously hit by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. This programme was 
introduced to regain investors’ confidence. By allowing companies to exercise 
buyback of their shares, investors receive capital gains that would encourage them to 
reinvest in the same company or in other companies. Companies would normally buy 
back shares when their share prices are perceived to be undervalued. In fact, share 
repurchase would drive up share prices and decrease the number of shares 
outstanding (Nadarajan, Ahmad, & Chandren, 2009). Under Section 67A of the 
Companies (Amendment) Act 1997, with proper application, public-listed companies 
in Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), currently known as Bursa Malaysia, are 
allowed to buy back their own shares. In addition, the Malaysian Accounting 
Standard Board (MASB) in April 1999, through a “share-buyback accounting and 
disclosure” circular, stated that companies engaged in repurchasing their own shares 
should report all such transactions in their financial statements.  
Table 1.2 shows that public-listed companies in Bursa Malaysia are 
increasingly using share repurchase as a way to attract investors. Share repurchase 
started to grow in 2001 and continued to increase with the highest level recorded in 
2008 with 204 companies. However, it decreased to 196 companies in 2009. The 
repurchase mechanism only caught attention in recent years, as many companies are 
still arguing about the quality and effectiveness of this programme, learning from 
more matured markets, such as the United States.  
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Table 1.2 
Executive Summary of Share Buyback in Bursa Malaysia between  
1999 and 2009 
Year Total number of companies 
1999 12 
2000 13 
2001 26 
2002 32 
2003 62 
2004 70 
2005 127 
2006 145 
2007 154* 
2008 204* 
2009 196* 
Note. Adapted from Ramakrishnan, Ranindran, and Ganesan, 
2007, The Star, January 30, 2010* 
 
 
Companies use dividends instead of share repurchases to signal that the 
company is well managed (Allen, Bernardo, & Welch, 2000). Paying dividends 
increase the chances of the company being noticed by institutions for its quality. 
Thus, companies are prepared to make their shareholders pay dividend taxes for 
signalling their quality. Markets do not react significantly different from zero when 
companies decrease dividends, when they engage in repurchase programmes. 
However, the share price drops if the company does not make share repurchase 
(Grullon & Michaely, 2002) and market reaction is positive for both payout methods 
initiated by IPO companies (Jain, Shekhar, & Torbey, 2009). 
Based on the Malaysian practice, a company might repurchase its own shares 
for various purposes, such as for employee option plans, and reissuance or 
redemption without any time limits (Sabri, 2003). Hence, if a company has executive 
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stock options plans, there is a lesser likelihood of payout in the form of dividends 
(De Jong, Van Dijk, & Veld, 2003) since stock price decrease during ex-dividend 
date (Kahle, 2002). Another purpose of the share repurchase plan is to discourage 
unfriendly takeovers (Gitman, 2006). With repurchase, the company value increases 
and consequently, the potential acquirer would have to pay a higher price in order to 
pursue the takeover activities (Bagwell, 1991).  
Managerial entrenchment is reflected from the combination of dividend and 
share repurchases in the company (Hu and Kumar, 2004). Managers who are 
concerned about shareholder wealth in the long term tend to buy back shares 
(Ikenberry & Vermaelen, 1996). On the other hand, entrenched managers usually 
choose dividend payout or a mix of payout (dividend and share repurchase). Since 
there is an increasing trend in Malaysian companies towards using share repurchase, 
it is important to examine the manager payout preference.  
1.5  Problem Statement 
Malaysia is ranked among the countries with high anti-director rights. It has 
strong legal minority shareholders protection against decisions made by managers or 
major shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). 
However, the enforcement of this legal protection is still poor in Malaysia, as agency 
problems are unable to be resolved (Krishnamurti, Sevic, & Sevic, 2005). Hence, 
Malaysian companies still face high agency problems (Kallunki, Sahlstrom, & Zemi, 
2007).  
Debt financing could be used to monitor company’s management (Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996), though this mechanism is not suitable to be implemented in 
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Malaysia to discipline managers, as the financial market is still immature (Suto, 
2003; Tam & Tan, 2007). Another problem faced in Malaysia is the function of 
hostile takeovers to monitor managers. As stated by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), the 
hostile takeover mechanism almost did not exist, because the large shareholder group 
might also include the CEO, or the group might be affiliated with the top 
management. Due to this weakness, managers in Malaysia are able to easily entrench 
their positions. Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), and Farinha and Lopez-de-
Foronda (2009), suggested the use of dividend policy as a disciplinary mechanism 
for controlling managers. The role of managerial power in dividend policy remains 
mostly unanswered (Welch, 2004). Therefore, this thesis is keen to identify the 
usefulness of dividend payout policy as a monitoring device of entrenched managers 
in Malaysia.  
Managerial entrenchment by itself represents a sign of agency problem 
(Zwiebel, 1996 and Hu & Kumar, 2004). Entrenched managers ensure that their 
positions are secure  if the company fails to attain its objectives. Most of the previous 
literature negatively views managerial entrenchment when the managers try to 
preserve their position. Even in Malaysia, numerous authors (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; Sulong and Ahmed, 2011) examined the relationship 
between ownership structure or board structure on dividend payout policy and 
indirectly linked it with the influence of entrenched managers. Unfortunately, only 
few researchers (e.g., Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, 
2009; Florackis & Ozkan, 2009) examined the process of how managers are able to  
entrench themselves in the company. By understanding the way and the level of 
managerial entrenchment, the issue between entrenched manager and their impact on 
company decisions. 
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The country’s legal and judiciary system, the board of directors and 
ownership structure are the three important factors that determine the effectiveness of 
corporate governance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). However, in 
Malaysia, mechanisms to monitor entrenched managers and controlling shareholders 
are still lacking (Satkunasingam & Shanmugam, 2006). Minority shareholders cannot 
depend on the board of directors in Malaysian companies to secure their wealth, as it 
is dominated by the large shareholders. Apart from that, Malaysian companies with 
political patronage have selective privileges to impose rules and regulations (Gomez, 
2006). To some extent, they yield to the appointments of less experienced staff due 
to political influence. Top managers are able to entrench their positions since they 
are less likely to be fired and replaced even though they show poor performance, as 
the appraisal process involves state and party bureaucrats (Tam, 2000; Tenev, Zhang 
& Brefort, 2002). Unfortunately it is difficult to predict the relationship between 
manager and dividend payout in companies with political influence (Bushee, 1998; 
Gul, 1999a; Pound, 1988). 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group Survey (2009) reported that the 
infrastructure sector showed an inconsistent dividend payout pattern, even when the 
EPS increases. Plantations and trading/services sectors pay almost the same 
dividends despite the differences in their earnings. Surprisingly, the construction and 
hotel sectors, which incurred losses, were still distributing dividends to their 
shareholders. According to Moh’d, Perry, and Rimbey (1995), this is due to maturity 
and information capacity in those sectors. In addition, each sector has its own level 
of free cash flow problems and this is reflected in the level of dividend payment 
(Zechauser & Pound, 1990). This results in the managers behaving differently in 
performing their tasks. Malaysian plantation and consumer products companies pay 
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the highest dividend, since they are less involved in growth opportunities and hold 
high cash surpluses (Pandey, 2001). Meanwhile, due to the capital intensive nature, 
Malaysian property sectors have low payout policy (Yahya & Mahmood, 2011). 
Thus, many are questioning the manager’s role and influence in dividend payout 
decisions, that is, whether an increase or decrease in their earnings has any influence 
on their payout decisions. Nevertheless, there is still no research conducted on the 
managerial entrenchments in different sectors. 
Malaysian managers have low incentives to disclose information in their 
financial reports, especially for losses. Among the four common law countries, 
Malaysia was ranked third in terms of transparency (Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003). 
Therefore, to reduce asymmetric information between manager and shareholders, the 
company could reduce cash in the hands of entrenched managers by including both 
dividends and share repurchases (Kim, 2010). In the presence of entrenchment, 
companies with weak governance prefer to choose dividend payout or mixed payout 
(dividend and share repurchase). However, managers with better governance tend to 
choose stand alone share repurchase (John & Kynazeva, 2006). Corporate 
governance in Malaysia does not function effectively. If an entrenched manager is 
able to influence share repurchase, then it indirectly protects the entrenched 
managers despite their poor performance. When a company continuously 
experiences a decrease in stock price, one alternative is to use share repurchase to 
prevent a hostile takeover. This indirectly protects the manager from being replaced 
in the takeover. However, in Malaysia, not many studies have been done on 
evaluating the entrenched manager’s payout preference, either dividends only, mix of 
dividends and share repurchase or stand alone share repurchase. 
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Further, a board’s structure would encourage entrenchment. A large number 
of members sitting on the board would provide more voice regarding the intuitive 
decisions on dividend payout. However, it is not easy to persuade all the members to 
make similar decisions. Jensen (1993) suggested that a small number of board 
members could help companies to improve on their performance. A company would 
be less effective, while the CEO gains easier control of the board, if the board of 
directors consists of more than seven or eight people. In Malaysia, a number of 
companies have more than eight members on the board, such as Sime Darby Berhad, 
Ajinomoto (Malaysia) Berhad, Berjaya Corporation Berhad, and Hiap Teck Venture 
Berhad.  
Logically, the board recommends the CEO’s remuneration and the final 
dividend decision belongs to the same board of directors after appraising the 
company’s performance (Hanh, 2007). Managers would not voluntarily give up their 
positions even when they are not performing, since a lot of private rents and high 
salaries are at stake (Wang, 2011). According to Tharuman Rajah (Head of Hay 
Group Human Resource), some companies show a weak relationship between 
remuneration and performance. To hold onto their power and to be entrenched in the 
company, the managers make investments that reduce the probability of them being 
replaced, that allow them to get higher wages, and enjoy better perquisites from 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).  
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Table 1.3 
Remuneration of CEOs and Top Executives in 2007 in Malaysia 
Name Company 
Total 
Remuneration 
(RM million) 
Tan Sri Lim Kok Thay Genting Bhd 86.50 
Datuk Nazir Razak Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Bhd 9.35 
Tan Sri Rozali Ismail Puncak Niaga Holdings Bhd 5.20 
Ralph Marshall Astro All Asia Network Plc’s Group 3.40 
Tan Sri Amirsham Abdul Aziz Maybank 2.71 
Datuk Seri Ahmad Zubir Murshid Sime Darby Bhd 2.05 
Datuk Yusli Mohamed Yusoff Bursa Malaysia Bhd 1.97 
      Notes: Adapted from The Star, December 13, 2008 
For example, Table 1.3 shows that the CEO of Sime Darby was among the 
top highly paid CEOs in 2007. Yet, despite enjoying such high remuneration with a 
large board (13 members), it did not inspire him to continuously give his best for the 
company. He invested in a few unprofitable projects that caused his company huge 
losses of almost RM1 billion in 2010. This indicates that Malaysian corporate 
governance best practices are ineffective, if non-performing directors are being 
rewarded with sufficient level of remuneration, while the agency problem is not 
effectively controlled.   
In summary, this study proposes to examine the influence of managerial 
entrenchment towards companies’ dividend distribution from the perspective of 
different types of ownership (concentration, government, foreign, and managerial 
ownership). Due to many uncertainties and doubts, the “dividend puzzle” is an 
ongoing issue and worth being explored.  
1.6  Research Objectives 
Current knowledge shows that the prediction on dividend payout in Malaysia 
are those done by researchers who only make connections between the different 
types of company ownership structure, such as government, foreign or family and 
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dividend payout. Each type of company ownership must have a manager, especially 
a CEO, who implements the BOD’s strategy, manages the day-to-day operations, and 
indirectly influences dividend payout decision. The gap that this dissertation attempts 
to answer is whether a manager’s holding power and entrenched position could 
influence the company’s payout decision. Companies’ dividend payout policy is 
affected by various market imperfections, such as agency cost, asymmetric 
information, and transaction cost.  
Thus, the following are the main objectives of this research: 
(1) To examine the influence of managerial entrenchment on the dividend 
payout policy of the Malaysian public-listed companies in Bursa 
Malaysia. 
This would indicate the influence of managerial entrenchment on 
dividend payout selection. The managerial influence on dividend payout is 
examined in pre, during and post crisis periods. This thesis also specifically 
addresses the influence of governance mechanism on dividend payout decisions 
in companies where the highly entrenched manager controls the management. 
The pertinent question is: Will managerial entrenchment be inversely related to 
dividend payout? 
(2) To investigate the relationship between managerial entrenchments and 
dividend payout decisions in different sectors. 
Different companies pay different payouts. Some industries follow their 
earning patterns to make payout distribution. This study intends to identify the 
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manager’s influence on dividend distribution in the Malaysian listed companies from 
different sectors.  
(3)  To determine the main preference of managerial entrenchment, either 
dividend payout or stock repurchase. 
Share repurchase is on an increasing trend, substituting or combining with 
dividend payout as total payout to shareholders. This research objective would   
determine the direction of such preference. 
Researchers recognized this and hence, assessed the correlation between 
managerial entrenchment and dividend payout policy with the involvement of agency 
cost. This study intends to extend the earlier research in the Malaysian context. 
1.7  Research Questions 
The following research questions are explored: 
RQ1: Does managerial entrenchment influence the direction of dividend 
payout policy in the Malaysian public listed companies?  
RQ2: Does managerial entrenchment influence dividend payout decision in 
the different sectors? 
RQ3: Does an entrenched manager prefer dividend payout or stock 
repurchase? 
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1.8  Significance of the Study 
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature on dividend 
payout policies. First, this research includes ownership and other variables in a 
framework compared with previous studies that researched them separately 
concerning dividend payout policy. A number of researches were conducted 
regarding managerial entrenchment. For example, Berger et al. (1997), De Jong and 
Veld, (2001), and Wang (2011) studied the relationship between managerial 
entrenchment and capital structure; Collins and Huang (2010) examined the cost of 
equity; Kaoru, Takizawa, and Tsuru (2011) looked at antitakeover provision in 
Japan; Surroca and Tribo (2010) examined corporate social performance; and 
Brochet and Gao (2004) investigated earnings smoothing. Studies regarding 
managerial entrenchment and dividend payout could be seen in Hu and Kumar 
(2004); Jo and Pan (2009); Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2009); and Lee (2011), who 
based his study on the U.S. data for the period 1990 until 2004. However, the 
similarity in all these papers is that they did not include ownership as one of 
important components in measuring managerial entrenchment. Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009) based their study on U.K. panel data and included ownership in measuring 
managerial entrenchment. However, their study was on agency cost, not dividend 
payout.  
 Jensen in 1986 stated that separate ownership entities result in agency 
problem with the manager working for his or her personal interests. Since ownership 
in Malaysia varies with concentration, managerial, government, and foreign 
ownership, the results are expected to show different dividend payments policies 
with agency problems of type I and type II. Yet, there are not many empirical studies 
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on managerial entrenchment and dividend payout policy in Malaysia. Most of studies 
in Malaysia are more focused on studying the relationship between ownership 
structure and dividend payout (Ameer, 2007; Chu & Cheah, 2004; Mat Nor & 
Sulong, 2007; Ming and Gee, 2008; Mohd Hassan Abdullah, Ahmad, & Roslan, 
2012; Ramli, 2010; Sulong & Ahmed, 2011; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008). Thus, based 
on the Malaysian context, this research contributes to the growing literature on 
ownership structure and dividend payout, filling the research gap by including 
managerial entrenchment as one of key components that influence payout 
distributions. The results might vary with different countries due to differences in 
corporate cultures, management, and norms. 
Most prior studies relied on Governance Index Scores (G index) constructed 
by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Entrenchment Index Scores developed by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) to measure the level of managerial 
entrenchment. To construct these indices, all the information is gathered from 
companies with antitakeover provisions (ATPs). Nevertheless, this information is 
more focused on external governance. However, instead of only based on external 
governance to measure the level of managerial entrenchment, it is important to 
consider both internal and external governance. Therefore, this research applies the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct entrenchment index by including 
information on both internal and external governance. By including both the 
information, the measurement of the level of managerial entrenchment would be 
more accurate.  
Each industry has different laws and regulations that the manager has to 
comply with, different features, and different composition of optimal capital 
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structure. For example, the construction industry is capital intensive, while the 
services industry relies more on human labour. Thus, the manager behaves 
differently to influence his or her company’s dividend payment. This study examines 
the significance of ownership structure and managerial entrenchment towards 
dividend payout decision in different industries. Most  prior  studies were more 
focused on overall industry  data, such as SAP 500 companies, (Collins & Huang, 
2010; Jiraporn & Chintrakarn, 2009), or only on one particular sector like the 
industrial sector (Berger et al., 1997; Jo & Pan, 2009) to examine  the impact of 
dividend payout distribution with managerial entrenchment. This research  extends 
on four individual sectors namely, properties sector, consumer sector, industrial 
sector, and trading and services sector to see the impact of managerial entrenchment 
on dividend payout. It is important to examine this issue in determining the 
seriousness of managerial entrenchment in different sectors in Malaysia.  
Investigating these issues is important to determine to what extent a manager 
is able to influence the dividend payout decisions. Understanding the entrenched 
manager who is involved in setting the dividend policy contributes towards helping 
policy makers and companies to appropriately address the issues on why a company 
decides to pay or not to pay dividend and make stock repurchases. The evidence in 
identifying the direction of managerial entrenchment and dividend payout policy 
would present the norm for listed companies in Malaysia. This research would also 
add to the body of knowledge in regard to the factors that influence managerial 
decision making in the payout mechanism of listed companies in Malaysia. 
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1.9  Scope of the Study 
This research focuses on public listed companies in Bursa Malaysia 
(previously KLSE) main board. The study tests the influence of managerial 
entrenchment on payout decision based on ownership structure in different 
industries. This study includes all companies that made payout distribution to all 
shareholders during the period from 2005 to 2010.   
1.10  Outline of the Study 
This study is organized into six chapters. The first chapter presents the 
introduction to the study. It includes an overview and trend of managerial 
entrenchment and dividend payout in Malaysia. In addition, it also discusses the 
problem statement, objectives and research questions, as well as the significance of 
the study. The second chapter covers the theoretical review, relevant literature 
conducted abroad and in Malaysia, followed by discussion on the theoretical 
framework of the study. The third chapter provides details of the methodology and 
data including sample selection, empirical framework and description of variables. 
Subsequently, the hypothesis development is also presented in this chapter. In the 
fourth chapter, the results and analysis are presented. The fifth chapter cover the 
discussions of major study. The conclusions of the study are discussed in the final 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0  Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant journal articles related to this research. It 
helps to identify the important variables used in gathering evidence for managerial 
entrenchment and payout decision, to learn from significant findings of past studies, 
and to develop a theoretical framework for further investigation as well to formulate 
the hypotheses to be tested.  
2.1 Theoretical Review 
Under theoretical review, a few theories related to a manager’s decision and 
dividend payout are discussed. Previous studies provided contradicting arguments 
about the function of dividend payment towards shareholder wealth. Some 
researchers believe that dividends are able to signal a company’s performance 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Lintner, 1956) while others believe that dividends could 
monitor the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Dividend and monitoring 
are substitutes and optimal to mitigating agency and transaction costs (Rozeff, 1982). 
2.1.1 The Dividends’ Signalling Theory 
Recent events have shown that even well performing companies are reluctant 
to increase dividend payment. However, there are also some companies, that despite 
their lower net income, continue to announce constant or an increase in their 
dividend payments. Prior to the Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend theory, 
Lintner (1956) presented a model based on stylized yield of the specific 
